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BURMA AFTER ELECTIONS IN 2010: 
“SOMETHING WILL HAPPEN”
Over the  past  few weeks  scholars  and policy  makers  have assumed that  the  elections  in  Burma, 
though not entirely free and fair, would create a “window of opportunity”. This “window of opportun-
ity” could lead to democracy in Burma over the medium- or long term. Yet, these exceptions are not  
only  misleading;  they also ignore the  ongoing systematic  human rights violations by the military 
junta, who targets ethnic minorities in particular. The ethnic ceasefire groups and their political or-
ganisations are no longer willing to accept these human rights violations. Prior to the elections, they  
declared that they would take care of their people. 
On Election Day on Sunday November the  7th the  fifth  brigade of  the  DKBA (Democratic  Karen 
Buddhist Army) translated their announcement into action and took control of the city of Myawaddy 
because Burmese regime troops had forced Myawaddy’s inhabitants to go to the polls.  Expecting up-
coming fights between the Burmese army and the DKBA thousands of Myawaddy’s residents crossed 
the border to Thailand and fled to Mae Sot. On Tuesday afternoon most of them started returning to 
Myawaddy after Burmese Junta troops had retaken control of Myawaddy.  
But this is only the starting point of a wave of violence in post-election Burma. Ethnic armed troops  
are “ready to fight” having already formed an alliance to help each other in the event of an attack by  
the Burmese military in October.  
Burmese exile groups had labelled the upcoming elections as a “Farce”, which were only organised to 
ensure military rule. Even though moderate parties within the parties in exile assume that Aung San 
Suu Kyi could hold office in medium term, the elections are not considered to be the starting point of 
a possible democratisation process. The only benefit of the elections is the documentation of the milit-
ary junta’s bad governance over the course of the next administration. This could create time for the 
emergence of so a democratisation process in Burma.
However, the ethnic resistance groups are not willing to make any concessions in terms of time to the  
“new” Government.  The DKBA, which broke away from the KNU (Karen National Union)/ KNLA 
(Karen National Liberation Army) in 1995, may have started reunification with the KNLA these days 
in order to fight the Burmese military together.
Conflict resolution can only be achieved by a tripartite dialogue encompassing the NLD (National 
League for Democracy) and the ethnic groups – if they are willing to do engage in such a tripartite  
dialogue. But as long as this dialogue is blocked by the SPDC (State Peace and Development Council)  
the ethnic resistance groups will probably consider armed force as their only opportunity. The elec-
tions  could constitute  a  turning  point  because the  ethnic  groups could take  joint  military  action 
against the Burmese government. Moreover, the democratic opposition is not willing to accept the le-
gitimisation of the military regime through fake elections. In contrast to the ethnic groups the demo-
cratic opposition does assume that the democratisation of Burma can be achieved through a peaceful  
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revolution. 
The international community’s strategy - and especially Germany - in promoting civil society inside 
Burma as their main strategic approach will not lead to any sustainable democratic change. By con-
trast, this strategy could be seen as an engagement out of economic reasoning. The strategy can even 
be counterproductive,  if  ethnic  armed groups consider  the  use  of  force  as  a legitimate  means to  
achieve their objectives, because of the lack of international support.
By now, a strong international statement is requested which not only condemns the human rights vi-
olation by the military junta but also puts – unlike the poorly implemented sanctions by the European 
Union - pressure on the Burmese government. 
Even if the possibilities of the international community to support human rights and democracy in 
Burma should be restricted, because of contradicting  interests within the international community, 
the international community has to live up to its responsibility  to show that human rights abuses by 
the Burmese government are no longer tolerated. If the international community could not undertake 
joint action due to human rights violations in Burma, it should at least do so on account of the re-
cently documented nuclear ambitions of the Burmese Government.
This paper only reflects my personal point of view and does not reflect neither the opinion of any persons I  
talked to nor the Center of Conflict Studies. This paper is mainly based on interviews I had conducted in Brus-
sels and Thailand this year. Among others, I had meetings with members of the NLD-LA, DPNS, KNU/KNLA, 
EBO, AAP, ALTSEAN Burma and international human rights organisations. 
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